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Abstract 
 
This study analyzes the impact on income inequality of government efforts to increase 
agricultural incomes in rural China.  It collects and analyzes survey data from 473 
households in Yunnan, China in 2004.  In particular, it investigates the effects of 
government efforts to promote improved upland rice technologies.  Our analysis 
shows that farmers who adopted these technologies had incomes approximately 15 
percent higher than non-adopters.  Despite this relatively large increase, we estimate 
that the impact on income inequality was relatively slight.  This is primarily due to the 
fact that lower-income farmers adopted the improved rice technology at rates that 
were roughly equivalent to those of higher-income farmers.  .   
 
 
JEL Categories:  O13, O18, O53, Q12 
 
Keywords:  Rural economic development, Chinese economic development, upland 
rice, rural-urban income inequality, agricultural income policy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the last several decades, China has made unparalleled progress in increasing 
incomes and reducing poverty.  Government policy, and changes in government 
policy, can rightly be credited with much of this progress.  One undesirable 
consequence of this progress has been the widening income gap between rural and 
urban areas.  The current rural-urban income gap is the result of a long-term trend that 
began in 1978 with the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping.  In 1978, rural incomes 
were approximately 39 percent of urban incomes.  By 2010, they had fallen to 30 
percent (NBS, 2009).  This has occurred despite a massive reallocation of labor from 
rural to urban areas.  Over the same period, the share of China’s total population 
living in rural areas fell from 82 percent to approximately 50 percent (NBS, 2009). 
 Chinese policy-makers are keenly aware of the political ramifications 
associated with the widening gap between rich and poor (e.g., Jiang, 1997).1  This has 
resulted in a proliferation of policy initiatives.2 A major thrust of these initiatives has 
been the effort to increase rural incomes via state support of agriculture.  This is 
evidenced by the large increases in the national government’s agricultural budget that 
have occurred in recent years. For example, national budget spending on agriculture 
increased in real terms from 25 billion RMB Yuan in 1990, to 81 billion RMB Yuan 
in 2000, and to 533 billion RMB Yuan in 2009 (MOF, 2009).3  
 One key component of the government’s agricultural policy has been the 
encouragement of productivity improvements in “marginal” agricultural land in rural 
areas via local extension services.4  These areas are of particular importance because a 
                                                 
1 For example, see http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6911854.html . 
2  For example, CPAD [1994] initiated China's 8-7 National Poverty Reduction Program; CPG [2001] 
launched the West Areas Development Strategy. 
3 Expenditures are in 1990 constant Yuan. 
4 The Chinese government re-established its public agricultural extension service in the late 1970s. By 
the middle of the 1980s, China had established public agricultural extension service stations in every 
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large portion of low income households are congregated there.  Improving their 
incomes is key to reducing urban-rural income inequality in China. 
 A potential problem with these efforts is that they may increase local income 
inequality.  Indeed, a large literature, stimulated by interest in the consequences of the 
“green revolution,” reports that agricultural technology adoptions can sometimes 
worsen income inequality (Griffin, 1974; Pearse, 1980, Lipton and Longhurst, 1989; 
Freebairn, 1995).  Numerous studies have investigated income inequality in rural 
China (Chen and Zhang, 2009).  Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles (2005) report that most 
rural inequality is due to local (within village) differences rather than differences 
across villages or provinces.  While studies reach different conclusions as to the 
source of local income disparities, Ravallion and Chen (1999) conclude that when it 
comes to farm income, grain production is a major contributing factor.   
 Given this interest in rural income inequality, it is perhaps surprising that little 
is known about the distributional impacts of government-aided productivity 
improvements in Chinese farming communities.  We are aware of only one study that 
directly addresses the impact of improved agricultural technology.  Lin (1999) 
investigated the effects of F1 hybrid rice adoption.  He used data from a cross-
sectional survey of 500 households in 5 counties of Hunan Province taken in 
December 1988 and January 1989.  While he did not come to a definitive conclusion 
regarding income inequality, Lin found that adopters saw their rice incomes increase; 
and non-adopters saw their non-rice incomes increase.  The latter mitigated the 
income inequality effects of the former.   
                                                                                                                                            
county and township, including remote regions.  The system provided high-quality agricultural 
extension service. By the middle of the 1990s, it employed an extension staff of more than one million, 
approximately 70% of whom had graduated from technical high schools or colleges. More than 90% of 
these worked at public agricultural extension system stations at the county and township levels (Lu, 
1999; Hu, et al., 2009).  Based upon a survey of 28 counties in rural China, Hu et al. (2004) report that 
40% of new agricultural technologies adopted by farmers during 1996 and 2002 were generated from 
public agricultural extension services. 
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 An important difference between our study and Lin’s is that his study focused 
on hybrid, paddy rice adoption in lowland areas.  In contrast, our study focuses on 
hybrid rice adoption in upland areas.  It is the latter which is now receiving much 
attention in the development literature (Conway, 1999; Fan and Hazell, 2000; Pender, 
2008).  Pender (2008, page 7) writes: 
During the past several decades, dramatic improvements in agricultural 
productivity and the reduction of poverty have been achieved in many 
countries of South and East Asia. …Despite this progress, hundreds of 
millions of rural people in less-favoured environments – areas where 
rainfed agriculture dominates and where there are critical biophysical 
constraints such as low and uncertain rainfall, steep slopes and poor 
soil, or socio-economic constraints such as poor access to markets, 
infrastructure and services – have obtained much less benefit from this 
progress. 
 
 Gustafsson and Li’s (2002) finding of substantial heterogeneity in income 
growth rates across counties in rural China is a reminder that one-size-fits-all 
generalizations should be viewed with caution.  There is therefore a need for 
additional studies to confirm or disconfirm the findings of Lin’s (1999) research.  This 
study meets that need by analyzing the income effects of technology adoptions 
associated with the introduction of an improved upland rice variety.  We draw on a 
cross-sectional survey of rural households in Yunnan province conducted in 2005.  
While our study differs from Lin in some important respects, it reaches a similar 
conclusion.  We find no evidence that the adoption of improved upland rice 
contributes to increased income inequality.   
 Our study proceeds as follows.  Section II reviews Lin’s (1999) theoretical 
analysis of the impact of improved rice technology on household incomes.  Section III 
presents some background concerning the agricultural technology adoption studied 
here.  Section IV discusses the data used in our empirical analyses.  Section V reports 
the results of our investigations.  Section VI concludes. 
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II.  THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 Theory.  Lin’s (1999) model of the effects of improved rice technology 
provides a useful framework for understanding the issues associated with our 
empirical analysis.  The starting point is a two-good, two-household general 
equilibrium model where comparative advantage is driven by different input 
endowments of the households, as well as different input requirements of the two 
goods. The two goods produced are rice (R) and non-rice (N). Rice is assumed to be 
land-intensive; and non-rice, labor-intensive. The two households are indexed by 
i={1,2}, and possess endowments Ei. The production possibilities frontier of non-rice 
for Household i is defined as: 
 ( , )Ni i Ri iy F y E . 
It is assumed that Household 1 is land-abundant and has an endowment vector E1 that 
gives it a comparative advantage in rice. It is also assumed that there are no factor 
markets but perfect product markets, so that all transactions take place through the 
product market. The income of Household i is defined as 
 Ri Ni Ri
N
pI y y
p
  . 
Household i consumes a bundle (xRi, xNi) that maximizes its utility given the budget 
constraint 
 R RNi Ri i Ni Ri
N N
p px x I y y
p p
     
The equilibrium relative price of rice pR/pN is such that the excess supply of rice of 
Household 1 exactly equals the excess demand of rice of Household 2, and, 
simultaneously, such that the excess demand of non-rice of Household 1 exactly 
equals Household 2’s excess supply of non-rice.  
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 FIGURE 1 illustrates the equilibrium before technology adoption. For 
expositional purposes it is assumed that the two households have identical 
preferences, but that their PPFs differ due to differences in their factor endowments. 
Household 1’s PPF is biased towards rice and Household 2’s PPF is biased towards 
non-rice. The market-clearing relative price of rice results in Household 1 producing 
more rice and less non-rice than Household 2 (yR1 > yR2 and yN1 < yN2). 5  Therefore, 
Household 1 sells rice to Household 2 in exchange for non-rice. 
 FIGURE 2 illustrates the main result of Lin’s (1999) theoretical analysis.  Lin 
assumes that the household that has a comparative advantage in rice will also have a 
comparative advantage in rice technology adoption.  Hence it becomes the technology 
adopter. If the relative price of rice remains unchanged, adopters find it in their best 
interest to produce more rice and less non-rice.  This implies that the total output of 
rice goes up, creating an excess supply of rice, and causing the relative price of rice to 
fall.   
 This reduction in the relative price of rice will induce both the technology 
adopter and non-adopter to produce more non-rice output and less rice. Overall, 
adopters will produce more rice (yR1’ > yR1), but the change in non-rice will be 
ambiguous.  Non-adopters will produce less rice (yR2’ < yR2) and unambiguously more 
non-rice (yN2’ > yN2). The incomes of both households increase unambiguously. 
Comparing the outputs of the two households, as long as both yR1 > yR2 and yN1 < yN2 
prior to the technology adoption, it must be that technology adopters produce more 
rice and less non-rice than non-adopters (yR1’ > yR2’ and yN1’ < yN2’).  
                                                 
5 Notice that for this result to be true, Household 1 must not have access to more of both land and labor 
than Household 2, as it could produce more of both goods simply by having a superior endowment 
vector than Household 2. 
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 Lin (1999) confirms this prediction using a micro-dataset of rural Chinese 
farmers.  He concludes that the output adjustment of non-adopters towards non-rice -- 
the relative price of which has increased -- mitigates the local income inequality 
consequences of the new rice technology.   
 While Lin’s (1999) analysis is a useful starting point, it makes a number of 
simplifying assumptions that potentially limit its applicability. 
1. It assumes that all products can be traded.  If, for example, rice cannot be 
traded, then the household cannot move off of its production possibilities 
frontier, and the production of rice and non-rice will be determined by the 
tangency of the PPF and the relevant indifference curve.  As a result, price 
changes will not mitigate the income distribution effects from technology 
adoption.  
 
2. It assumes that the adoption of rice technology does not affect the production 
technology of other goods.  However, if there are productivity spillovers to 
other agricultural outputs, then income distribution effects from adopting 
improved rice technology could be intensified by increased production of 
other agricultural outputs.  
 
3.  It ignores the role of income distribution in technology adoption.  For 
example, if the benefits of improved rice technology are disproportionately 
distributed to wealthy (poor) farmers, then technology adoption will 
exacerbate (mitigate) income inequality. 
 
4.  It assumes away the role of factor markets.  If, for example, technology 
adoption requires greater (lesser) labor inputs, then labor could be taken from 
(released for) the production of other outputs (including leisure).6 
 
5.  It ignores the interaction of credit rationing with the wealth effect from 
technology adoption.  Higher incomes can allow households to purchase other 
inputs that can be used in livestock production and other activities that may be 
more profitable than rice farming (Heerink et al, 2006). 
 
6.  It does not account for complex interactions between production, 
consumption, and income distribution.  Concerning these interactions, Taylor 
and Adelman (1996, page 248) write: “In a world where some goods and 
factors are tradable and others are not, and where some households interact 
with outside markets and others do not, analytical models lose their usefulness 
for policy analysis; they are generally incapable of reliably predicting the 
magnitude or even the direction of policy and market impacts on local 
economies.”  
                                                 
6 David and Otsuka (1996, page 415) conclude that the adoption of hybrid rice generally increases the 
demand for labor.  However, they report that this does not appear to be the case for China, where the 
use of hybrid rice “reduces labor demand by about 4%” (pages 382f.). 
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All of the above reasons provide motivation to follow up Lin’s analysis with further 
empirical investigation.  
 Methodology.  In light of the theory above, our study adopts a two-step 
procedure to estimate the effect of technology adoption on income inequality.  First, 
we estimate the effect of technology adoption on the different components of farmers’ 
incomes.  We then simulate what farmers’ incomes would be in the absence of 
technology adoption.  These are then used to calculate Gini coefficients for the two 
scenarios of (i) technology adoption and (ii) no technology adoption.   
 
III.  BACKGROUND 
 
This study analyzes recent government efforts to improve upland rice productivity in 
southern Yunnan Province, China.  Yunnan Province is located in southwestern 
China, bordering Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar.  It is one of the poorest provinces in 
China.  10.6 percent of those living in poverty in China reside in Yunnan, despite the 
fact that the province comprises less than 4 percent of the total population.  A 
relatively large share of the population (about a third) consists of ethnic minorities.  
Agriculture is a major source of income, but only about 5 percent of the land is 
cultivated.  Approximately 94 percent of the land area is categorized as mountainous.  
Almost all cultivated land lies in elevated areas.  Planting is restricted to upland plains 
and sloped hillsides.  Slash and burn practices are quite common, and terracing is still 
relatively rare in remote areas.  Level land is extremely scarce.  Because of the 
relative isolation of villages, income security in the remote, mountainous areas of 
Yunnan is a concern for both the national and provincial governments.   
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 While some farmers raise maize as a staple food, rice is generally preferred.7  
Unfortunately, traditional varieties of rice are generally low-yielding on the upland 
slopes of Yunnan; and paddy rice is usually infeasible due to a lack of water.  To 
address this problem, rice scientists/breeders at Yunnan Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences (YAAS) have developed alternative upland rice hybrids.  This effort has 
been complemented by local agricultural extension services, which promote the 
adoption of the hybrid, upland rice.  Because these hybrids have greater growing 
requirements than traditional varieties, they require farmers to use chemical fertilizers, 
and are best used in terraced planting environments.  The local government provides 
subsidies for both the purchase of fertilizer and the building of terraces. 
 
IV.  DATA 
 
The data for this study comes from individual household surveys.  Preliminary work 
began in 2004 when a team composed of a rice breeder from YAAS and rice 
economists from Zhongnan University of Economics and Law (ZUEL) and the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) designed the survey, visited the area, and 
directed a pilot survey.  In 2005, teams from ZUEL and IRRI visited the area again 
and trained local staff from the county/township Agricultural Technology Extension 
Stations to administer the survey.  These teams then travelled to the respective 
villages, surveying households door-to-door.  Most surveys were conducted with the 
household head.   
 Southern Yunnan Province consists of five cities/prefectures.  A modified, 
stratified random sampling procedure was designed to ensure adequate representation 
by (i) city/prefecture, and (ii) area devoted to upland rice production.  Five strata were 
                                                 
7 Maize and traditional upland rice with very low yield served as staple foods in the study areas for 
hundreds of years. Improved upland rice technology introduction is seen by farmers as key for their 
staple food transfer from maize. 
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employed.  In decreasing order of aggregation, these were cities/prefectures, counties, 
townships, villages, and households.   
 Within each city/prefecture, 1-2 counties were randomly chosen, depending on 
whether the city/prefecture had less or more than 100,000 mu (6.669 hectares) of 
upland rice.  A total of 7 counties were chosen. 
 Within each county, 1-5 townships were randomly chosen, depending on 
whether the respective county had an upland rice area (i) less than 30,000 mu; (ii) 
between 30,000-60,000 mu; (iii) between 60,000-90,000 mu; (iv) between 90,000-
120,000 m;, and (v) greater than 120,000 mu.  A total of 15 townships were chosen. 
 One village was randomly chosen from each township, and approximately 30 
households were randomly chosen from each village.  A total of 473 usable household 
observations were produced in this fashion.  
 TABLE 1 reports characteristics of the sample, categorized by whether the 
household was an adopter or non-adopter of improved upland rice technology in 
2004.8  Technology adopters are defined as using a combination of improved upland 
rice varieties with terracing and/or chemical fertilizers. 
 A little over half of the households are technology adopters.  Adopters have 
annual incomes that are approximately 15 percent larger than non-adopters, where 
income includes both cash and imputed income.  A larger percentage of adopters’ 
incomes is derived from planting, and a smaller percentage from livestock and non-
farm production.   
 Average household size for the overall sample is 4.7 persons, and a little over 
half of all household members participate in the labor force.  Household heads for 
both non-adopting and adopting households average about 42 years of age, and the 
                                                 
8 The survey obtained retrospective information about income and technology adoption for the years 
2000, 2002, and 2004.   Our analysis focuses on the 2004 data. 
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maximum educational attainment of households is approximately 8 years of formal 
education.  Over 80 percent of adopting and non-adopting households are ethnic 
minorities.   
 Altitude is important in upland rice production.  According to experiments 
from YAAS, upland rice has greatest adaptability at altitudes below 1400.  Adopters 
are much more likely to locate in low altitude areas (less than 1400 meters).  They are 
also likely to have more land, live in a village with an extension program, and be 
located closer to market.  Rates of adoption differ widely across counties. 
 Much of the agricultural output produced in rural Yunnan farms is for self-
consumption.  Per unit market values were imputed in these cases.  The income values 
reported in TABLE 1 – and the income values studied in the subsequent analysis – 
comprise the sum of cash and imputed income.  TABLE 2 reports the extent of this 
income imputation for different samples of households.  Column headings refer to 
specific samples.  For example, total income data is available for 452 households, 
where “total” refers to the sum of income from food crops, cash crops, etc.  Data on 
income for food crops is available for 449 households.   
 Focusing on Column (1), we observe that most households in the “Total 
Income” sample had a combination of cash and imputed income, though 
approximately 2 percent of households had no cash income (i.e., agricultural 
production for these households was entirely for self-consumption and there was no 
non-farm income).  Even so, the average household in this sample received 
approximately 46 percent of its total income from production for self-consumption.  
The primary sources of self-consumption production were the producing of food 
crops (primarily upland rice, lowland rice, and maize) and livestock (pigs, cattle, 
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sheep, chickens, and ducks).  We emphasize that our subsequent income inequality 
analysis refers to the sum of households’ cash and imputed incomes.  
 
V.  RESULTS 
 
OLS estimation of the income equations.  The first step in our two-step procedure 
consists of estimating the effect of upland rice technology adoption on farmers’ 
incomes.  If the decision to adopt technology is independent of factors that contribute 
to a farmer’s income, then standard OLS regression, in the absence of 
misspecification, will provide an unbiased estimate of the “average treatment effect” 
associated with technology adoption.     However, the assumption of independence is 
questionable.  Therefore, we follow our OLS analysis with alternative methods 
designed to address endogeneity.  A comparison of the two sets of estimates will be 
informative.   
 Our OLS regression is designed to estimate the effect of technology adoption 
while controlling for important other variables.  Accordingly, we estimate the 
following specification relating farmers’ incomes to household characteristics: 
   0 1 i 2 i 3 ii
4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i
8 i
          ln Income =α + α Adoption  + α Household size  + α Labor proportion
                       + α Age + α Age-squared  + α Education  + α Ethnic minority  
                      + α Low altitude 9 i 10 i 11 i
6
c
12+c i i
c=1
+ α Total land  + α Extension + α Market distance  
                      +  α D  + ε .
The main variable of interest is Adoption, which is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the household is an adopter of improved upland rice technology.   
 The subsequent variables are included as controls.  Household Size is the 
number of persons in the household; Labor proportion is the share of total household 
members participating in the labor force; Age is the age of the household head; 
Education is years of schooling for the person with the highest educational attainment 
in the household; Ethnic minority is a dummy variable indicating that the household is 
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an ethnic minority; Low altitude is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the farm is 
situated at an altitude of 1400 meters or lower; Total land measures the area of the 
farmer’s total land holdings; Extension is a dummy variable indicating that an 
extension service is located in the village; Market distance is the distance of the 
household to the nearest market, and cD  is a county dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 for the cth county.   
 Adoption is expected to increase planting income from upland rice, and 
possibly other outputs depending on the extent of technology spillovers.  Household 
size (holding constant Labor proportion), Age, Education, and Total land can be 
thought of as inputs into the farm production function, so that their increase is 
expected to result in greater output (though Age may manifest diminishing returns).  
With Total land held constant, Low altitude proxies for better quality of the land 
input.  Market distance measures the cost of transporting tradable goods to and from 
the nearest local market, with greater distance expected to lower income.  The county 
dummies pick up unmeasured characteristics of the quality of agricultural inputs, the 
effects of which are a priori ambiguous.  The effects of Ethnic minority and Extension 
are also a priori ambiguous. 
 TABLE 3 summarizes the results of regressing farmers’ incomes on the 
variables above -- first with respect to total income, then with respect to the individual 
components of farmers’ incomes.  Note that the headings of Columns (2) and (3) of 
TABLE 3 differ from those of TABLE 2.  In other words, planting income is divided 
into the categories “Upland Rice” and “Other” in TABLE 3, compared to “Food 
crops” and “Cash crops” in TABLE 2.9   
                                                 
9 This is due to the fact that information about cash income was queried in a separate module of the 
household questionnaire, using different income categories, than the module that obtained price and 
quantity information about household production. 
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 Column (1) reports the effect of technology adoption on total income.  All of 
the coefficients have the expected signs, and most are statistically significant at the 5 
percent level (two-tailed test).  The coefficient on Adoption is highly significant and 
large in size.  Technology adopters are estimated to enjoy approximately 28 percent 
higher incomes, ceteris paribus.   
 It is also useful to look at the effect of adoption on the different components of 
income (cf. Columns 2 through 5).  We expect the coefficient for Adoption to be 
positive and significant for income generated from Upland Rice production (cf. 
Column 2).  The associated coefficient implies that households that adopt technology 
have “upland rice” incomes that are approximately 33 percent larger than non-
adopters, ceteris paribus.   
 But the Adoption coefficient on planting income from other crops is also 
positive and marginally significant.  This is the opposite of what Lin (1999) predicts 
and finds, and is consistent with the fact that upland rice technology may have 
spillover effects.  Unlike Lin’s study, technology adoption in our study includes not 
just the use of the improved upland rice hybrid, but also the employment of other 
bundled services provided by the Agricultural Technology Extension Stations.  These 
include the use of fertilizer and support in terrace building.  The latter two services are 
easily transferred to cash crops, where they are also expected to increase output.  Thus 
the positive and significant (at the 10-percent, two-tailed level) of the Adoption 
coefficient in Column (3) of TABLE 3 can be interpreted as evidence of a technology 
spillover.   
 Not only do we not see evidence of a negative Adoption coefficient for the two 
components of planting income, but neither do we see it for livestock and non-farm 
income.  In fact, the coefficient on the Adoption variable is positive and significant (at 
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the 10% level) for Livestock Income.  Recall that Lin (1999) predicted a negative 
effect on non-rice income as the relative rice price fell.  The lack of a negative rice 
price effect may reflect factors not considered by Lin.  For example, if the upland rice 
hybrid was labor saving, this could release labor for non-planting activities, such as 
livestock and non-farm production. 10 , 11 , 12  The associated increased income by 
adopters could balance any price-induced increase in non-rice income by non-
adopters.  This is unlikely, however, as the hybrid upland rice requires more labor 
inputs than traditional varieties, which do not use fertilizer and pesticides.  An 
alternative explanation is that the positive association with technology adoption 
reflects endogeneity. 
 Addressing endogeneity.  The previous analysis ignores the possibility that 
technology adoption may be correlated with other productive characteristics.  For 
example, farmers who are sufficiently enterprising in adopting new technology may 
also be enterprising in other ways that improve productivity.  Observed differences 
between adopters and non-adopters could reflect these inherent productivity 
differences rather than any productivity increases due to the new technology.   
 There are many ways to address endogeneity.  This section reports the results 
of our use of matching methods (MMs).  Matching methods compare the outcomes of 
two groups, one of which receives a “treatment” (in our case, “adopters”), while the 
other does not (“non-adopters”).  MMs can be used to address endogeneity when the 
factors related to the adoption of the treatment are all observable.   
                                                 
10 Subramanian and Qaim (2009) find evidence of a labor-saving effect from the introduction of Bt 
cotton in India. 
11 In the context of FIGURE 2, this would be reflected as a shift out of the PPF on both the rice and 
non-rice axes. 
12  An alternative explanation, also outside the Lin (1999) model, is that most of the increased 
production of upland rice from technology adoption goes towards self-consumption, so that there is 
very little effect on the relative rice price.  As a result, the non-adopting farmer does not change his 
production of non-rice.  In contrast, the lower shadow value of upland rice causes the adopting farmer 
to shift resources into non-rice production, so that, at the end, the adopting and non-adopting farmers 
receive similar incomes from non-rice production. 
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 While there are many variations, MMs have the common characteristic that 
they match members of the treatment group with one or more members of the non-
treatment group.  We employ five different MMs: (i) Nearest Neighbor Matching 
(NNM) without replacement; (ii) NNM with replacement; (iii and iv) NNM with 
replacement subject to satisfying calipers of 0.01 and 0.1; and (v) kernel matching.  A 
good review of these methods is provided by Todd (2008). 
 All of these methods require estimation of a “propensity score,” which 
measures the probability that a given member will receive the “treatment.”  A 
commonly used propensity score is the predicted probability from a probit regression.  
TABLE 4 reports the results of estimating probit equations for the same set of 
subsamples analyzed in TABLE 3.   
 While the column headings indicate income categories (e.g., “Total Income,” 
“Planting Income (Upland Rice)”, etc.), the dependent variable is Adoption, not a 
measure of income.  Thus, while Column (1) of TABLE 4 has the heading “Total 
Income,” it means that it is estimating the determinants of technology adoption for the 
same 452 observations used in the OLS regression of Column (1) of TABLE 3.  Note 
that Column (3) (“Planting Income-Other”) analyzes the same observations as 
Column (1) (“Total Income”), hence the corresponding estimation results are 
identical. 
 Looking across the columns, the following factors are found to be significantly 
and positively associated with the adoption of upland rice technology:  age of 
household head, amount of total land holdings, high altitude farm location, the 
presence of an extension service in the village, and distance from market.  Number of 
working household members is negatively and significantly related to adoption.  This 
latter result suggests that adoption of upland rice technology may serve as a substitute 
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for household labor.  County location of the household is also a significant 
determinant of technology adoption.  The inclusion of county dummies is important, 
as both the low altitude dummy and distance from market variable change signs when 
the county dummies are omitted.  Most of the other estimated coefficient signs have a 
straightforward interpretation.  
 The probit results of TABLE 4 are used to produce predicted probabilities of 
adoption for both adopters and non-adopters.  The respective MMs then compare the 
predicted incomes of adopters with those of closely matched non-adopters.  We do 
this for each of the five income categories of TABLES 3 and 4, obtaining predicted 
“average treatment effects” for each subsample.  These treatment effects can then be 
compared with the OLS results from TABLE 3. 
 Three features of a good matched sample are that (i) the covariates are good 
predictors of the treatment variable, (ii) a large percentage of the treated observations 
are included in the analysis, and (iii) the individual variables used to match adopters 
and non-adopters are “balanced” across the treatment and control groups.   
 With respect to (i), a common goodness-of-fitness measure for probit analysis 
is the pseudo R-squared.  These are reported at the bottom of TABLE 4 for the 
respective samples.  The probit equations display a significant degree of explanatory 
power, with pseudo R-squared values ranging from 0.32 and 0.37.  These are 
sufficiently high to justify the matching exercise and compare well with other 
studies.13    
 With respect to (ii), Panel A of TABLE 5 reports the percent of adopting 
observations included in the respective matching analyses.  For example, there were 
239 adopting observations in the sample of 452 observations analyzed in Column (1).  
                                                 
13 See, for example, the studies published in the “Symposium on the Econometrics of Matching,” in the 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. LXXXVI, No. 1, February 2004. 
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The NNM without replacement procedure uses 89.1% of these in the subsequent 
matching analysis.  With the exception of the Non-Farm Income sample (Column 5), 
the respective matching methods use a large percent of the total number of adopting 
observations.  For the Total Income sample (Column 1), all of the matching methods 
use 89% or more of the 239 adopting observations in the sample.   
 With respect to (iii), we use two approaches for measuring the “balance” of 
variables across adopter and non-adopter groups.  The Stata procedure “pscore” tests 
the balancing property using the algorithm described in Becker and Ichino (2002).14  
This procedure stratifies the sample based on propensity scores and then tests for 
significant differences between the covariates within strata.  If the data are 
“balanced,” there should be no significant differences between covariates within 
strata.  All of the matching procedures for all of the subsamples report that the 
balancing property is supported by the data. 
 The second approach calculates pseudo R-squared for the same probit 
specification used in TABLE 4, albeit this time restricting the observations to the 
respective matched sample.  If the covariates are well-matched/balanced, the decision 
to adopt technology should be random across the two groups, and the pseudo R-
squared should be close to zero.   
 Panel B of TABLE 5 reports the respective pseudo R-squared values for each 
of the MMs and subsamples.  Four of the five MMs show a substantial drop in the 
explanatory power of the respective probit equations when the sample is restricted to 
matched observations.  The exception is NNM without replacement.  In light of the 
above balancing results, the subsequent analysis restricts itself to matching estimates 
from the latter four matching procedures (NNM with replacement, NNM with 
                                                 
14  The “pscore” procedure is described in Becker and Ichino (2002). 
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replacement and caliper = 0.01, NNM with replacement and caliper = 0.1, and kernel 
matching). 
 We now proceed to estimating the effect of technology adoption on farmers’ 
incomes.  TABLE 6 reports the estimated “average treatment effect” for each of the 
respective methods and samples.  The last three rows report minimum and maximum 
estimated effects from the matching methods (omitting the NNM with replacement 
estimates as discussed above), and reproduce the OLS estimated effects from TABLE 
3. 
 The comparison of the OLS results with the minimum and maximum 
estimates from the MMs is illuminating.  First, the estimated effect of technology 
adoption is cut in half by the MMs; from approximately 29 percent (OLS) to between 
14 and 16 percent (MMs).  Second, the estimated adoption effect on upland rice 
income using matching methods is roughly in line with those obtained from OLS.  
The MM estimates range from 29 to 47 percent, while OLS produces an estimate of 
33 percent.  Third, we still see some evidence of technology spillovers, though 
smaller than estimated by OLS.  The MM estimates for Planting Income other than 
upland rice range from 5 to 13 percent, and are significant at the 10 percent level.  
This compares with an OLS estimate of 19 percent. 
 One puzzling result from the OLS analysis is not confirmed using matching 
methods.  The OLS procedure produces an estimated effect of technology adoption on 
livestock income of 17 percent, significant at the 10 percent level.  In contrast, the 
MM estimates are much smaller, ranging from 0 to 6 percent, and are statistically 
insignificant.  This suggests that the OLS estimate reflects endogeneity bias, rather 
than a real technology effect.  Finally, both OLS and MM procedures estimate an 
insignificant effect of technology adoption on Non-Farm income. 
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 Estimating the effect of technology adoption on income inequality.  We are 
now in a position to estimate the effect of technology adoption on farmers’ income 
inequality in Yunnan Province.  To do that, we compare two sets of estimated income 
distributions: the distribution of farmers’ incomes with and without technology 
adoptions.  The difference in the respective distributions is our estimate of the effect 
of technology adoption on income inequality within the sample. 
 We use the observed, 2004 incomes of farmers as our estimate of farmers’ 
incomes with technology adoption. 15   To calculate farmers’ incomes without 
technology adoption, we start with farmers’ incomes as observed in 2004.  For 
farmers who are technology adopters, we subtract the estimated effect of technology 
adoption from their observed income to get an estimate of what their income would be 
without technology adoption.  For non-adopting farmers, we use their observed 2004 
incomes. 
 As noted in the discussion of TABLE 6, there is a range of estimated effects 
across MM procedures and income samples.  Accordingly, we use three different sets 
of estimated technology effects on income.  We use the minimum, average, and 
maximum values in adjusting adopting farmers’ 2004 incomes to estimate what their 
income would have been in the absence of technology adoption.16 
 The corresponding Gini coefficients are reported in TABLE 7.  Column (1) 
(“With Technology Adoption”) reports Gini coefficients by income category for the 
full sample using the observed income distribution in 2004.  The next three columns 
(2a through 2c) simulate what the income distribution would look like by subtracting 
the respective average treatment effects from observed incomes for adopters.  As it 
                                                 
15 The assumption here is that future adoption of technology by current non-adopters will not affect 
income inequality results based on 2004 adopters. 
16 Minimum, average, and maximum values were calculated over the latter four MM procedures, 
omitting NNM with replacement, as the latter was judged to not satisfy the balancing requirement. 
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turns out, Gini coefficients for the simulated income distributions without technology 
adoption are largely indifferent to the size of the estimated treatment effect. 
 A comparison of the Gini coefficients in Columns (2a) through (2c) with those 
in Column (1) reveals that the adoption of improved upland rice technology is 
estimated to have had only a negligible impact on income inquality.  In each of the 
five income categories, the Gini coefficients associated with income distributions 
“With Technology Adoption” are virtually identical to those “Without Technology 
Adoption.” Despite the relatively large estimated impacts of technology income, as 
given by the MM estimates of TABLE 6, there is little evidence that this contributed 
to greater income inequality for the farmers of Yunnan Province. 
 The apparent contradiction of relatively large estimates of the impact of 
technology adoption in TABLE 6, and the negligibly small estimated income 
inequality effects in TABLE 7, is resolved by FIGURE 3.  This figure graphs the rate 
of technology adoption by income deciles.   The top panel estimates “pre-adoption” 
incomes in the same manner as described above for TABLE 6: Pre-adoption incomes 
are equal to observed incomes for non-adopters and, for adopters, equals their 
observed income minus the estimated treatment effect (calculated as the average of 
the MM estimates).  We then calculate rates of adoption within each of the 
corresponding income deciles.  While the relationship between technology adoption 
and income is non-monotonic, it is clear that lower-income farmers adopted 
technology at rates that were roughly equivalent to those of higher-income farmers.   
 To confirm this finding, we exploit the retrospective nature of our household 
survey.  In 2000, 336 of the farmers had not adopted the improved upland rice 
technology.  By 2004, 116 of these had become technology adopters.  We use the 
2000 incomes of the 336 farmers and divide these into income deciles.  We then 
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calculate the percent of farmers within each income decile who had adopted the 
technology by 2004.  The results are plotted in the lower panel of FIGURE 3.  We 
reach the same conclusion using this alternative approach.  Lower-income farmers 
adopt technology at rates that are roughly equivalent to those of higher-income 
farmers.  This is consistent with our  estimates that show that technology has had little 
effect on income inequality amongst the farmers in Yunnan Province. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
This study uses household income data from farmers in rural China to evaluate the 
effect of improved upland rice technology on income inequality.  Income inequality is 
a serious concern in China, where the rural-urban income gap has been growing wider 
in recent years.  As a result, both national and provincial governments have taken 
numerous steps to increase agricultural incomes.  A key component of these is 
government efforts to increase productivity via Agricultural Technology Extension 
Stations.  These have been widely used to promote new technologies among rural 
farmers.  A concern is that these government efforts may themselves induce greater 
local income inequalities if the benefits of government support are disproportionately 
distributed. 
 We look at one such effort in Yunnan Province.  Here, rice breeders have 
developed a new upland rice hybrid.  In combination with chemical fertilizers and 
terracing, these improved upland rice varieties offer substantial productivity gains 
over traditional upland rice varieties.  Village-based technology extension programs 
have been instrumental in encouraging the uptake of this improved technology.  Our 
study compares adopters with non-adopters to estimate the income effects of 
technology adoption, along with the corresponding impact on income inequality. 
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 Approximately half of the 473 households in our survey adopted the improved 
upland rice technology.  We estimate that total incomes were approximately 14-16 
percent higher for adopters.  Furthermore, we find that adopters experienced not only 
higher incomes from planting upland rice, but also from planting other cash crops.  
The latter result is contrary to the finding of Lin (1999).  We attribute this difference 
to the fact that the adoption of improved upland rice technology, which includes the 
use of chemical fertilizer and terracing, had spillover effects on cash crops.   
 Despite the fact that the associated income effects of improved upland rice 
technology are relatively large, we find no evidence to indicate that these translate 
into substantial increases in local income inequality.  This is due to the fact that 
lower-income farmers adopted technology at rates that were roughly equivalent to 
those of higher-income farmers.  We note that this conclusion is broadly consistent 
with the findings of Lin (1999), despite there being substantial differences in our 
studies.  While additional research is called for, this provides some degree of 
encouragement that government efforts to raise rural, agricultural incomes are not 
being undermined by the exacerbation of local income disparities.  
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TABLE 1 
Mean Values of Household Variables for Adopting and Non-Adopting Farmers 
 
Variable Non-Adopters Adopters
Number of households 220 253 
Annual income (RMB) 12,087 13,700 
Natural log of annual income 9.04 9.27 
Percent of income derived from plantinga 47.10 57.22 
Percent of income derived from livestockb 44.91 37.33 
Percent of income derived from non-farm productionc 7.99 5.45 
Household size (persons) 4.66 4.70 
Proportion of household in labor force 0.57 0.53 
Age of household head 42.23 41.64 
Maximum educational attainment of household (years) 7.96 7.97 
Ethnic minorityd (dummy variable) 0.827 0.877 
Low altitude (dummy variable) 0.359 0.597 
Amount of irrigated land (mu)e 1.15 1.33 
Amount of terraced land (mu) 2.64 4.43 
Amount of sloped land (mu) 13.21 16.66 
Amount of fruit garden land (mu) 0.13 0.09 
Amount of forest land (mu) 4.82 5.66 
Amount of waste land (mu) 0.37 0.52 
Total amount of land (mu) 22.32 28.69 
Village with extension program (dummy variable) 0.727 0.893 
Distance from market (kilometers) 13.03 10.19 
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Variable Non-Adopters Adopters
Cangyuan county (dummy variable) 0.118 0.016 
Jinghong county (dummy variable) 0.014 0.119 
Lancang county (dummy variable) 0.350 0.166 
Menghai county (dummy variable) 0.236 0.059 
Menglian county (dummy variable) 0.132 0.518 
Pinbian county (dummy variable) 0.082 0.047 
Wenshan county (dummy variable) 0.068 0.075 
 
a In addition to upland rice, planting income is derived from: 1) maize and paddy rice (in 
upland areas, not all farm households plant paddy rice due to limited land resources and 
rainfall); 2) rapeseed and buckwheat; and 3) perennial plants such as tea, rubber, 
sugarcane, and coffee.  
 
b Livestock income is primarily derived from 1) pigs (which are also raised for self-
consumption), 2) draught animals (in some cases, farm households sell their cattle), and 3) 
chickens and ducks. 
 
c Non-farm income sources primarily include: 1) transfer payments (e.g., government 
Slope Land Conversion Program), and 2) local casual labor work.  
 
d There are a large number of minority ethnic groups represented in our sample, including 
Yi, Bai, Hani, and others. 
 
e 1 mu = 0.06667 hectares. 
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TABLE 2 
Extent of Income Imputation 
 
Variable 
Income 
(Total) 
(1) 
Income 
(Food crops) 
(2) 
Income 
(Cash crops) 
(3) 
Income 
(Livestock) 
(4) 
Income 
(Non-farm) 
(5) 
Number of households 
(Total income) 452 449 453
 445 157 
Number of households 
(Cash Income) 444 174 301 341 157 
Percent of households with no cash income 1.8 61.2 33.6 23.4 0 
Average household total income (RMB) 12951 3364 3508 5135 944 
Average household cash income (RMB) 7050 1030 3507 1569 944 
Percent of average household total income 
that is imputed 45.6 69.4 2.9 69.4 0 
 
NOTE:  The full sample consists of 473 households.  The observations in the table record observations used in the subsequent 
empirical analysis.  Not all households could be used because (i) the dependent variable is the log of income, and some of the 
households had nonpositive income values; and (ii) some of explanatory variables had missing values.  The reason there are more 
observations for Cash Crop Income than Total Income is because one household had positive Cash Crop Income but negative Total 
Income. 
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TABLE 3 
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Upland Rice Technology Adoption on Farmers’ Household Incomes 
 
Variable Total Income (1) 
Planting Income 
(Upland Rice) 
(2) 
Planting Income 
(Other) 
(3) 
Livestock 
 Income 
(4) 
Non-Farm 
Income 
(5) 
Adoption 0.2505  (2.85)*** 
0.2835 
(2.63)*** 
0.1698 
(1.88)* 
0.1557 
(1.81)* 
0.0448 
(0.18) 
Household size 0.1253 (4.20)*** 
0.0785 
(2.89)*** 
0.0613 
(1.09) 
0.1510 
(4.00)*** 
0.0871 
(1.03) 
Labor Proportion  0.3054  (1.55) 
0.1321 
(0.75) 
-0.4118 
(-1.11) 
0.3542 
(1.42) 
0.4741 
(0.89) 
Age 0.0321  (1.58) 
0.0324 
(1.69)* 
0.0725 
(1.90)* 
-0.0191 
(-0.74) 
-0.0204 
(-0.30) 
Age-squared -0.0004  (-1.56) 
-0.0004 
(-1.81)* 
-0.0008 
(-1.90)* 
0.0003 
(0.95) 
0.0002 
(0.23) 
Education 0.1968  (3.57)*** 
0.0117 
(0.23) 
0.1710 
(1.65)* 
0.3106 
(4.42)*** 
0.4497 
(2.95)*** 
Ethnic minority -0.0537  (-0.22) 
-0.0734 
(-0.31) 
0.7775 
(1.69)* 
0.0366 
(0.12) 
-0.7507 
(-1.37) 
Low altitude 0.4972  (4.43)*** 
0.7528 
(7.30)*** 
0.1472 
(0.70) 
0.4676 
(3.30)*** 
0.8919 
(2.15)** 
Total land 0.0145  (5.54)*** 
0.0139 
(5.88)*** 
0.0284 
(5.78)*** 
0.0064 
(1.92)* 
0.0110 
(1.54) 
Extension 0.0431  (0.42) 
0.3404 
(3.50)*** 
-0.0580 
(-0.30) 
-0.0919 
(-0.72) 
0.1964 
(0.47) 
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Variable Total Income (1) 
Planting Income 
(Upland Rice) 
(2) 
Planting Income 
(Other) 
(3) 
Livestock 
 Income 
(4) 
Non-Farm 
Income 
(5) 
Market distance -0.0128 (-1.45)   
-0.0136 
(-1.61) 
-0.0374 
(-2.24)** 
0.0028 
(0.25) 
0.0019 
(0.06) 
Lancang county   0.1780  (1.62) 
0.2184 
(2.14)** 
0.2209 
(1.07) 
0.4403 
(3.17)*** 
0.9151 
(2.84)*** 
Cangyuan county   -0.1187  (-0.75) 
-0.9641 
(-6.74)*** 
0.6508 
(2.18)** 
-1.3037 
(-6.43)*** 
-0.2373 
(-0.25) 
Menghai county   0.0796  (0.42) 
-0.2929 
(-1.63) 
0.2526 
(0.70) 
0.2201 
(0.91) 
0.7869 
(1.13) 
Jinghong county   0.7517  (2.64)*** 
0.3329 
(1.26) 
0.8401 
(1.56) 
0.8925 
(2.47)** 
1.1894 
(1.28) 
Wenshang county   0.2175  (0.79) 
-0.1643 
(-0.62) 
0.8654 
(1.66)* 
-0.2484 
(-0.71) 
1.1459 
(1.65) 
Pinbian county   0.2740  (0.91) 
0.0660 
(0.23) 
0.4206 
(0.74) 
0.7576 
(2.00)** 
0.3316 
(0.47) 
R-squared 0.3449 0.4985 0.2407 0.2969 0.2874 
Observations 452 405 452 445 157 
 
NOTE:  The dependent variable is the natural log of income.  The omitted county is Menglian county.  Estimated standard errors are 
robust to heteroscedasticity. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
 
*, **, *** Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 4 
Probit Estimates of the Probability of Upland Rice Technology Adoption 
 
Variable Total Income (1) 
Planting Income 
(Upland Rice) 
(2) 
Planting Income 
(Other) 
(3) 
Livestock 
 Income 
(4) 
Non-Farm Income 
(5) 
Household size -0.0834 (-1.42)  
-0.1059  
(-1.64)* same as Column (1) 
-0.0917  
(-1.53) 
-0.0838 
(-0.85)  
Labor Proportion -0.8317  (-2.13)** 
-0.9701  
(-2.32)** --- 
-0.9065  
(-2.27)** 
-1.5151  
(-2.34)** 
Age 0.0790  (1.88)* 
0.0831  
(1.71)* --- 
0.0889  
(2.08)** 
0.1690  
(1.90)* 
Age-squared -0.0009  (-1.95)* 
-0.0010  
(-1.83)* --- 
-0.0010  
(-2.13)** 
-0.0018  
(-1.84)** 
Education -0.0321  (-0.30) 
0.0658  
(0.57) --- 
-0.0583  
(-0.53) 
0.0249  
(0.14) 
Ethnic minority 0.7381  (1.44) 
0.4493  
(0.75) --- 
0.7773  
(1.50) 
-0.2113  
(-0.26) 
Low altitude -0.6138  (-2.77)*** 
-1.0610  
(-3.72)*** --- 
-0.5853  
(-2.61)*** 
-0.6747  
(-1.16) 
Total land 0.0193  (3.49)*** 
0.0171  
(2.74)*** --- 
0.0203  
(3.56)*** 
0.0114  
(1.33) 
Extension 1.0450  (4.68)*** 
1.3102  
(5.60)*** --- 
1.0782  
(4.75)*** 
1.9679  
(3.47)*** 
Market distance 0.0776  (3.81)*** 
0.0676  
(3.06)*** --- 
0.0806  
(3.86)*** 
0.0160  
(0.33) 
 32
Variable Total Income (1) 
Planting Income 
(Upland Rice) 
(2) 
Planting Income 
(Other) 
(3) 
Livestock 
 Income 
(4) 
Non-Farm Income 
(5) 
Lancang county   -1.4734  (-7.26)*** 
-1.8064  
(-7.30)*** same as Column (1) 
-1.4838  
(-7.22)*** 
-1.3667  
(-3.30)*** 
Cangyuan county   -0.0186  (-0.05)*** 
0.2866  
(0.59) --- 
0.2210  
(0.55) 
-1.8689  
(-1.88)* 
Menghai county   -2.3732  (-6.32)*** 
-3.0525  
(-6.65)*** --- 
-2.3680  
(-6.29)*** 
-2.4653 
(-6.65)*** 
Jinghong county   -4.2379  (-6.19)*** 
-3.8997  
(-5.99)*** --- 
-4.3234  
(-6.17)*** 
-2.6528  
(-1.78)* 
Wenshang county   -0.5767  (-1.04) 
-1.6161  
 (-2.41)** --- 
-0.6067  
(-1.09) 
-1.5292  
(-1.60) 
Pinbian county   -1.2440  (-2.10)** 
-2.1163  
(-2.96)*** --- 
-1.1645  
(-1.95)* 
-2.2261  
(-2.21)** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.324 0.374 --- 0.338 0.323 
Observations 452 405 --- 445 157 
 
 
NOTE:  The dependent variable is the natural  log of income.  The omitted county is Menglian county.  Estimated standard errors are 
robust to heteroscedasticity.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  Column (3) is identical to Column (1) 
because they use the same observations. 
 
*, **, *** Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 5 
 
A.  Percent of Adopting Observations Included in the Matching Analysis by Procedure and Sample 
 
Procedure Total Income(1) 
Planting Income 
(Upland Rice) 
(2) 
Planting 
Income (Other) 
(3) 
Livestock 
 Income 
(4) 
Non-Farm 
Income 
(5) 
NNM without replacement 89.1% 69.9% 89.1% 88.1% 83.3% 
NNM with replacement 97.5% 87.0% 97.5% 92.4% 83.3% 
NNM with replacement and caliper = 0.1 97.5% 87.0% 97.5% 92.4% 83.3% 
NNM with replacement and caliper = 0.01 91.6% 74.9% 91.6% 86.9% 48.6% 
Kernel 91.6% 74.9% 91.6% 86.9% 48.6% 
Total Number of Adopters 239 239 239 236 72 
 
 
 
B.  Indicators of Covariate Balancing: Pseudo R-Squared 
 
Procedure Total Income(1) 
Planting Income 
(Upland Rice) 
(2) 
Planting 
Income (Other) 
(3) 
Livestock 
 Income 
(4) 
Non-Farm 
Income 
(5) 
BEFORE 0.325 0.374 0.325 0.338 0.324 
AFTER      
NNM without replacement 0.290 0.273 0.290 0.300 0.175 
NNM with replacement 0.048 0.162 0.048 0.069 0.140 
NNM with replacement and caliper = 0.01 0.051 0.142 0.051 0.068 0.100 
NNM with replacement and caliper = 0.1 0.048 0.162 0.048 0.069 0.140 
Kernel 0.045 0.111 0.045 0.042 0.095 
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TABLE 6 
Matching Estimates of the Effect of Technology Adoption on Farmers’ Incomes 
 
Procedure Total Income (1) 
Planting Income 
(Upland Rice) 
(2) 
Planting 
Income (Other) 
(3) 
Livestock 
 Income 
(4) 
Non-Farm 
Income 
(5) 
NNM without replacement 0.180 (2.47)** 
0.311 
(3.50)*** 
0.276 
(2.27)** 
-0.037 
(-0.85) 
-0.149 
(-0.33) 
NNM with replacement 0.129 (2.71)*** 
0.387 
(3.98)*** 
0.051 
(2.40)** 
-0.004 
(-0.79) 
-0.217 
(-0.36) 
NNM with replacement and caliper = 0.01 0.141 (2.33)** 
0.300 
(2.75)*** 
0.048 
(2.08)** 
0.026 
(-0.91) 
0.025 
(-0.35) 
NNM with replacement and caliper = 0.1 0.129 (2.43)** 
0.387 
(2.94)*** 
0.051 
(2.05)** 
-0.004 
(-0.92) 
-0.217 
(-0.40) 
Kernel 0.147 (2.41)** 
0.252 
(2.67)*** 
0.120 
(2.49)** 
0.059 
(-0.97) 
0.000 
(-0.33) 
Minimum estimated effecta 0.129 0.252 0.048 -0.004 -0.217 
Maximum estimated effecta 0.147 0.387 0.120 0.059 0.025 
OLS estimated effect (from TABLE 3) 0.251*** 0.284*** 0.170* 0.156* 0.045 
 
NOTE:  The dependent variable is the natural log of income.  Z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  The 
procedure for estimation of standard errors is described in Becker and Ichino (2002).   
 
a Minimum and maximum estimated effects do not include estimates from the “NNM without replacement” procedure because of its 
poor balancing properties. 
 
*, **, *** Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 7 
The Effect of Upland Rice Technology on Income Inequality 
 
INCOME SOURCE 
WITH 
TECHNOLOGY
ADOPTION 
(Observed) 
(1) 
WITHOUT TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION (Simulated)
Using Smallest 
Estimate 
(2a) 
Using Average 
Estimate 
(2b) 
Using Largest 
Estimate 
(2c) 
Total Income 0.382 0.382 0.382 0.382 
Planting Income  
(Upland Rice) 0.508 0.506 0.508 0.507 
Planting Income  
(Other) 0.543 0.541 0.538 0.533 
Livestock Income 0.479 0.478 0.479 0.481 
Non-Farm Income 0.880 0.879 0.879 0.880 
 
NOTE:  Numbers in table are Gini Coefficents.  “With Technology Adoption (Observed)” represents the 
observed degree of income inequality; i.e., it uses observed household income for both adopters and non-
adopters.  “Without Technology Adoption (Simulated)” calculates Gini coefficients as follows:  For non-
adopters, it uses observed incomes.  For adopters, it subtracts the MM estimates from TABLE 6, using the (i) 
smallest, (ii) average, and (iii) largest estimated treatment effects from the respective samples in TABLE 6.
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FIGURE 1 
Equilibrium Before the Technology Adoption 
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FIGURE 2 
Equilibrium After Technology Adoption Without Spill-Over Effect 
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FIGURE 3 
Technology Adoption as a Function of Farmer’s Income 
 
 
A. Pre-Adoption Incomes Calculated as Post-Adoption Incomes  
Minus Estimated Treatment Effect for Adopters (Full Sample) 
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B. Pre-Adoption Incomes Calculated as Incomes  
of Non-Adopters in 2000 (336 Non-adopters in 2000) 
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